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TRENDELENBURG AND HEGEL.

An excellent notice of "Trendelenburg and his Works" appears in the *New Englander* for April, 1874. Its author, Prof. Morris of Michigan University, was one of Trendelenburg's pupils at Berlin, and treats his theme with something of filial enthusiasm. The glimpses which he gives us of the spiritual biography of Trendelenburg are quite important. For example, we see how true his later attitude towards Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, was to his earlier training. "The ancient languages and the mathematics are the way to the heights of humanity and into the innermost nature of things" is a remark quoted from his address made upon entering his rectorship of the University of Berlin. "The foundations of this opinion," remarks Prof. Morris, "were laid under König, under whose direction the reading of the classics was to him" (as he himself says) "a stimulus leading him to seek for the spirit of the ancients in their writings, to strive to learn how to think after the model of the great thinkers, and to clothe his thoughts in similar beautiful forms." Under the same teacher, also, Trendelenburg enjoyed the advantage of private instruction in Logic and Philosophy, Kant's works being made especially the subject of sympathetic and careful study, while the sentiment towards Fichte was cooler, and Hegel was declared by the instructor to be to him incomprehensible, and his "pure thought" the "*πρῶτον ψεῦδος* of modern Philosophy." Not much wonder that with such preparation Hegel's lectures should "fail to inspire conviction in him," nor is it any wonder that the subjective inability to comprehend a profound writer should come to be considered evidence of the falsity of his system. It seems that his ultimate stand-point in philosophy was reached quite early. Indeed in his graduating theses he took the following positions: "The study of etymology discloses a popular philosophy of Conceptions"; "In philosophy as elsewhere belief precedes knowledge"; "As negation without presupposed affirmation is impossible, so also is pure skepticism"; "Kant's uncognizable 'things in themselves' do not follow even from his demonstrations concerning the nature of space

and time"; "As space and time are pure and primitive forms of intuition, so also is motion such a form."

In the doctrine that motion is a primitive form of intuition, we have the *πρῶτον ψεύδος* of the system of Trendelenburg. Not in that the doctrine does not cover one of the profoundest speculative ideas—for it does—but in that it is ambiguous, we find the source of the negative criticism which he has directed against Hegel, and which has led him to deny Pure Thought or the Logos. If "motion" or "movement" be taken in its concrete sense as involving time and space, and if it be true that the thinking activity of man cannot transcend this category of movement, then it cannot in any adequate manner think eternal essences, *nor indeed think itself, or the mind*, unless the mind is a process in time and space and possessing no infinitude (or return into itself). The skeptical tendencies of such a view have not yet been fully deduced—indeed scarcely opined. If, however, we take "motion" or "movement" in the sense of self-movement" as conceived by Plato—a sense in which Trendelenburg seems at times to conceive it—we have a category transcending the motion or movement in time and space—a sort of primordial motion which is the logical condition of time and space, but not in turn conditioned by the latter. To such a category (*Bewegung*) the English word *activity* is a better name than *motion*. That the category of activity is a fundamental one few will doubt, or, if they do, a short psychological investigation after the style and method of Fichte will convince them. But this primordial category of activity is not only not derivable from time and space, but it is the concept which makes the thought of time and space possible; in fact, it is through analysis of this idea of activity that we conceive space or time. The thinking which thinks Time, Space, or Being, performs an analysis of this primitive thought of activity and seizes its moments or complemental elements. If it reflects upon its act it will discover the other suppressed (or unconscious) phases in its thought, and will see them to be abstractions from the thought of self-activity. The so-called pure thoughts, Being, essence, cause, substance, quality, quantity, &c., are isolated fragments of this total thought of self-activity—sundered by abstracting reflection from the

total concrete Thought. They are called "pure" because they are so universal as to apply to the spatial phase of things and likewise to the time-phase; they apply to things and events in Nature, and to things and events in the spiritual world—hence they are more general than either province; they transcend the conditions of either, or rather they are themselves the archetypes and conditions of all. But if these abstract and partial phases of self-activity transcend the real world of Nature and Spirit, much more does the self-activity itself.

Hegel wrote his *Logic* to prove just this very doctrine that self-movement or self-activity is the primordial Idea. He did not establish it by arguments, but by showing it as the presupposed logical condition of each and every pure (general) thought, and of each and every phase of the real world. In his *Phenomenology of Spirit* he makes the same demonstration in inverse order.

As Trendelenburg seems sometimes to involve this doctrine in his theories, the question arises how he could have rejected Hegel's system of pure thought. We see him through his life fighting unweariedly against the Hegelian conception of Logos or Pure Reason, and the weapon ever in his hands is this doctrine of "motion" as primitive intuition. His *Logical Investigations* follow Hegel's first deductions step by step, pointing out in the predicates applied to the would-be pure thoughts the appearance of the concrete category of movement, and, besides this, still more concrete presuppositions derived from sensation and imagination. Had not "his sentiment toward Fichte been cooler," through the narrow, dogmatic influence of König his tutor, it is quite possible that he might have learned to know the sense in which Hegel used the term *pure thinking*. The wonderful psychological analysis which Fichte carried out exhaustively seizes not only the objects of thought, but the activity which thinks that object. It makes continual synthesis of the form and content of thought, and thus ascends (in the language of Plato) back to the primitive whole presupposed by the fragmentary or partial activity of finite thinking. Pure thinking is *exhaustive thinking*. "It deals with wholes or totalities" is Plato's description of it. Thus in the *Logic* Hegel starts

from the simplest and emptiest abstract thought. It is the most immediate thought: the one that lies directly in the way of the mind when it begins to act. All thinking presupposes in its object at least the *form of being*. For its objectivity implies so much directly. That it implies much else appears in the course of the logical investigation which Hegel makes. He is careful, however, that it shall not borrow from empirical psychology or from dogmatic reflection. The gaze of the mind upon the thought of Being discovers first its presupposition of a complete negation: it is held in the tongs of negation. But further logical investigation discovers that this negativity implied in the thought of Being is moreover a self-related negating; for its activity contradicts its result. In other words, if I attempt to think the simple or abstract Being—to think that which shall be apart from all else and primitive, and have no relations with anything else—and if, for this purpose, I negate in thought its sphere of relation, I have before me an object which is antithetically opposed to another sphere. My thinking, in the act of thinking it, places it in opposition to its predicates. If I predicate of it simplicity or indeterminate-ness, I place it in antithetic relation by that very act, and thus posit it in contradiction to its definition. Its form of predication contradicts its content. I affirm of it indeterminateness; but in the very same act I determine it by giving it a predicate. At this point the Kantian disciple stops and says: “The difficulty is insurmountable: I cannot think the unconditioned because my thought conditions it.” But he stops thinking just on the eve of accomplishing something, and deprives himself of the privilege of solving the problem of the genesis of ideas. Let him fix his mental eye firmly on what transpires in his thought or attempted thought of the simple or indeterminate, and he will see that, instead of dead result, a pure nought, or Being, or whatever it may be called, he really thinks a *process*, an activity. He thinks a negative result, and instantaneously joins to it the perception of the act from which it results. He, in fact, perceives an activity instead of a dead result. He attempts to seize a simple (Being), and in his act seizes something else than what he attempted to seize, and thus repels from him the object.

Like Tantalus, he causes the objects to retreat by reaching to seize them. His bringing-near is an act of removal. The thought of a simple is the thought of the negative removal of a simple—its self-repulsion. Its self-repulsion is again the self-repulsion of self-repulsion. Our total thought of a Simple is that of continual withdrawal or evanescence; it is a *ceasing-to-be*. If, in our attempt to reach through the evanescence, we seize the idea of nought, we find it likewise a process. In thinking it we relate it, place it in antithesis, and thus determine it. Our thinking it (or attempt to think it) results in actually thinking a becoming. Such ultimate simples as nought and Being cannot be thought except as terminal points of a process or activity; and what we really think when we attempt to realize them in thought, is an activity of becoming in its phases of ceasing or beginning. So long as we think abstractly, and do not fully perceive our own thought, we may suppose that we think such abstract categories as Being or nought, and fail to see any possibility of the dialectical process. But when we look with clear insight upon the activity of thinking we become aware of what transpires.

But one may ask, why all this waste of words over such abstractions? "Does anybody ever attempt to think Being and nothing except for the purpose of learning Hegel?" To this the reply is that Being and nothing are the categories of all immediate knowledge. Any subject whatever which we begin to think, is thought first under the phases of Being, nought, and becoming. Not only these, but a long series of categories succeed in our thinking activity without distinct notice on our part, except when we turn upon them a trained attention. Fichte's writings furnish the discipline requisite for this work. He shows how the simplest act of cognition of an object in the external world contains in it implicitly a fourfold reflective act wherein the mind has successively united synthetically the form of its knowing with the content of the same. 1st, it *feels*—the activity of its sensory is feeling, hence entirely subjective; 2d, it notes the form of its feeling, which is abstract succession or *time*; 3d, it notes the form in which its feelings, present and remembered as occurring in a time-series, occur, and this form is *space* or

abstract coördinateness; 4th, it notes the form in which it thinks of a succession of points of *feeling* as existing in *time* and *space*, and thus cognizes the form of Causality; 5th, finally, with its fourth act of reflection upon the form of its cognition of this series now in a causal relation, it reaches the form of Substantiality. It recognizes its being affected through the causality of an external body and its own self-determination in the apparent passive relation in which it stands to the object of its perception. A man sees a tree or a house, and all this process goes on in his thinking without his noticing the steps. But he *does* seize the results, and he *may* seize the psychological steps that lead to the results. The results may exist only as a conviction or emotion to which he can give no name, nor of it recognize any genesis, but still it is all there. The mere recognition of self that takes place in the lowest savage who can say "I am," "I feel," presupposes a being capable of eternal progress in culture, and of immortal and independent existence after the death of the animal body; but a knowledge of this implication may be only a dim superstition in his mind derived from the clairvoyant moment of one of his tribe. Or it may, even in a civilized people, exist only as a tradition or a religious faith, and not as the result of insight.

In the description of the psychological process by which the dialectic of being, nought, and becoming, appears, I have used figurative expressions, and even direct metaphors, to convey my thought. Hegel did the same, and through this incurred the criticism of Trendelenburg. If figures of speech were used, we were told exultingly that here was found the concrete content of experience, which furnished the basis of the dialectical movement. It was the concrete idea of movement, or the idea of unity, or something else smuggled in to help out the thought paralyzed in the presence of the inane spectres of Being and Nought.

Now, what are figures of speech and why used? What is their effect when introduced into an exposition of pure thought? First, it is evident that a figure would be no figure unless it was intended to illustrate by one or more of its phases (usually a striking phase) the being or process of something else. It must be identical in some one or

more of its phases, but also different in other phases. Were it identical throughout, it would be no figure but a literal statement. Again, to the person who does not transcend in thought the substance of the figure, it is no figure or illustration of something else. Figures of speech, therefore, contain application or illustration of pure or general thought, but are not adequate statements of pure thought itself. Such illustration for the purpose of conveying thought is no more objectionable in philosophy than in poetry. It endeavors to elevate the thought of the reader to the comprehension of its ideas by seizing something already familiar, and, selecting some one of its phases, pointing it out as in some respect identical with what it wishes him to comprehend. One learns to walk in the first instance by holding on with the hands. But figurative language is only valuable as suggesting and stimulating that activity of thought which transcends it. The reader is to abstract the identity of the figure with the subject illustrated, from its difference, and learn to hold it by itself.

But, after the psychological validity of this process is shown, there still remains the question relative to its objective validity. How are we to conclude that these subjective conditions are laws of reality?

The appeal from thought to reality is in general an appeal from fancy or imagination to experience. It could not be an appeal from what the mind finds to be a rational necessity to a necessity of objective things, because all universal and necessary laws are cognized in one and the same way. *A priori* in geometry it is found that the three angles of all triangles must equal two right angles. No one having seen this to be a law founded in the nature of space, would think for a moment that such necessity was merely subjective, and not as objective as space itself. In a stricter sense, what happens to the categories of pure thought happens in the realm of the conditioning possibilities of things, and what we think as necessary cannot exist otherwise. As an example, take the Pure Being which stands at the beginning of logic. Thinking finds its truth to be that it is only a phase of an idea involving a synthesis of it and the idea of nought. Suppose we were to consider it as a reality, how would it behave? It could not have any relation to aught else without

destroying its nature; it could not be determined in itself; it could not exist either for itself or for anything else. In fine, it could not be identical, nor different from itself or from aught else, nor could aught else be without destroying Pure Being. With such conditions we see at once the falsity of such a supposed Pure Being. It could be only a figment of abstraction, however necessary such abstract thought might be at the beginning of its operations. Were Being real, it would necessarily relate to somewhat, and this involves otherness. That which exists only in relation, necessarily is a process of interaction.

That the accurate statement of the synthesis involved in thinking Being or naught names it "the becoming" there can be no doubt. Activity is there but in its first, most inadequate phase. As such empty activity it is simply the process to and from Being and naught—a vague process, including what is meant under the term Becoming. Here the thinker has not reached any goal, however. He must inquire: Since I cannot find any truth in the repose of Pure Being; since, in fact, the latter is no repose, but the unrest of absolute self-contradiction,—where, then, is the abiding? A dialectical examination of the idea of becoming discovers to him the necessity of *the return into itself* of a form of activity when considered as by itself and unconditioned through any other. It is easy to recognize the objective truth of the result of the dialectical examination of the Becoming, if we apply it to any concrete sphere considered as a whole. Take the cosmological thought of the development of the world. If the world is an evolution from chaos, it must be also a return to chaos; if not, then it is an eternal running down, with no winding up, and this contradicts its relation to time. Supposing that from chaos a definite length of time will allow of a given stage of development: all its future stages of development lie in it potentially on the first day. Only a finite time can separate a potentiality from its realization. If an infinite time were required to realize it, it could never be realized, and were no potentiality or possibility. But to a developing world the time past is more than sufficient to evolve all its possibilities, for time past is greater than any finite time. *Ergo*, the evolution observable in Nature is cy-

clical, or involves return into itself; otherwise it would have exhausted itself an indefinite period before this time. A universal becoming must needs be a circular process, and the synthesis of its counter movements gives us a new category having the form of an abiding, but not such an abiding as was sought in Pure Being. It is the abiding in the form of self-returning process.*

When, therefore, Trendelenburg states Pure Being to be a repose, and pure naught to be a repose also, we see that he takes the first uncritical stand-point of reflection and holds fast to it as the ultimate. He assumes, moreover, that Hegel wishes "to draw out of them the Becoming." "It is not contained in them; and pure thought being unable to draw from them what they cannot yield, nor to add this to them from its own resources, is really compelled tacitly, but surreptitiously, to call in the required idea of motion from the sphere of sensible intuition." "Thus motion, without a word of explanation, is assumed by the dialectic method, which pretends to assume nothing." "This pure thought, presupposing only itself, can, notwithstanding its simplicity, not advance without aid, and it shows itself in its very first step indissolubly joined to an idea in which space and time are perceived to be involved; it is therefore not pure thought, completely unfettered from external or concrete Being." In these sentences is clearly enough indicated the assumption that Hegel's method undertakes to deduce a richer and concreter idea from a poorer and more abstract one: a mistake natural enough to the novice, but altogether absurd to one who has carefully studied *The Phenomenology of Spirit* or the complete edition of Hegel's *Logic*. His method is to discover in an idea what presuppositions it has, and to add to it what it needs to make it possible. Instead of finding becoming *in* Being, it finds Being to presuppose Becoming as the activity of which Being is a mere phase. Becoming in its turn, too, is found to be a phase of a greater synthesis, &c. Instead of finding itself constrained "to call in a required idea" from the sphere of sensible intuition "to help it out of the void of being," it is only by the most persistent

* I have attempted a more adequate statement of this in the *Jour. Spec. Phil.*, vol. vii. pp. 38, 41, 46 and 47.—Ed.

and critical concentration of the attention on the activity of thought in thinking Being that one sees any dialectic. It is by an exhaustive survey of an idea that one finds its necessary presuppositions. This is the reason that Hegel significantly remarked, at the beginning of the *Logic*, that the only presupposition there made was the ability to think. He expected that one would not rely on sensible intuition to help out the thought, but be able to hold each idea by its definition and detect its inadequacy. The dialectic is simply the subsumption of an idea under itself—the application of the test of universality to it. If an idea posits another in order to make itself thinkable, it is clear that the two are one thought.

But it is the most difficult thing to understand how Trendelenburg calls the category of motion, as used in regard to ideas, “external motion,” when he calls motion a “pure and primitive [i.e. not derived from experience] form of intuition” in another place. As before remarked, such a view of motion as makes it always external motion would inevitably lead to the denial of all conception of thought or mind in itself, or indeed of all spiritual activities.

Lacking insight into the method of regressive procedure from the inadequate through its presuppositions to the more adequate, Trendelenburg’s critique of Hegel’s doctrine of the negative is necessarily very unsatisfactory. It exhibits not Hegel’s defects so much as the completely formal nature of his own habits of thinking. His attempt to put Hegel’s doctrine of Being and Naught into the second figure of the syllogism, by using the predicate “immediate” as the middle term, is of the same character. Hegel’s statement, if reduced to syllogistic form, is this:

- A. Whatever is devoid of determinations is identical with Naught [i.e. it has no characteristics wherein it *can* differ];
- B. Pure Being is devoid of all determinations,—and
- C. Hence identical with Naught.

Thus we have the first figure of the syllogism.

If he had said:

- A. Being is absolutely indeterminate;
- B. Naught is absolutely indeterminate;
- C. Therefore Being is Naught.

From the fact that indeterminateness prevents the possibility of difference, the conclusion would have followed, not from the necessity of the figure, but from the fact that the middle term which forms the predicate is not qualitative in the sense that it allows other determinations besides the predicate in the subject. If the comprehension of the major term were entirely distributed in the middle term, and that of the minor term were likewise distributed in the middle term, a positive conclusion could be drawn in the second figure. In fact, this is the most common mathematical syllogism, and is expressed in the axiom: If two quantities are equal to a third, they are equal to each other.

SHAKSPEARE'S "WINTER'S TALE."

By D. J. SNIDER.

This play is characterized by its frequent and direct defiance of the senses. Time and Space, which constitute the basis of the great world of sensation, seem to be entirely given over to the capricious play of the Poet's imagination. Even the so-called truths of the Understanding are laughed at in wanton mockery. History, Chronology, and also Geography, are violated with an audacity which has often called forth the sneers and the ire of pedantic erudition. Christianity consults the Delphic oracle, Pagan customs are mingled with those of the English people, ancient Greece is one of the modern European system of states, Bohemia is made a country bordering on the sea. Indeed the Understanding becomes utterly confused by the disregard of its facts and its laws, and can make nothing out of the play. It is plain to be seen that there is an utter neglect, or rather an intentional defiance, of all external probability. In fact Probability, as a canon of Shakspearian criticism, is wholly meaningless and inapplicable; there is scarcely a play in which it is not violated; the time has come when it ought to be eschewed altogether. The Poet seems to have proceeded thus on purpose: in other dramas, as in *Tempest*, he has